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RACE LIBERALISM AND THE DERADICALIZATION
OF RACIAL REFORM
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw
In the era that followed the formal collapse of white supremacy, efforts to sustain and broaden reformist agendas against the denouement
of social justice movements exposed a series of discordant debates on
the Left. While many such conflicts surfaced throughout the social order, some of these debates were staged in elite spaces like Harvard Law
School. The Harvard Law School boycott of 1982 reflected a rupture
among race-reform advocates between what I call “race liberalism,” an
ideology that ultimately embodies a “colorblind” model of racial justice
that seeks to eliminate “discrimination,” and a “critical race” discourse
focused on the distribution of racial power, a perspective requiring the
very race consciousness that race liberals saw as the evil that reform
aimed to transcend. In the 1980s, the rhetorical battles between these
two camps played out in a number of contexts, including, for example,
debates about race-conscious affirmative action policies in elite
institutions.
The temporal and institutional setting of the battles exposed how
knowledge production in legal education was an arena of racial contestation not unlike the lunch counters and ballot boxes that confronted
civil rights advocates in the decades before. When students of color
demanded a say in how race and law would be conceptualized as a field
of inquiry, they challenged the deepest pretense of liberal sensibility —
that universities themselves are apolitical arbiters of neutral knowledge
rather than participants in the struggle over how social power is
exercised.
Harvard Law School was a generative site of struggle over the norms
and content of elite legal education, particularly in shaping the contours
of liberal-radical conflict about law and social transformation. The liberal project of enhancing social mobility and democratic participation
through rationality and rights was a foundational commitment of the
Civil Rights Establishment (CRE)1. The legal face of race liberalism
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
 Professor of Law, Columbia Law School and University of California, Los Angeles, School of
Law. I am grateful to the many colleagues who read multiple versions of this Article and to participants at the Social Justice Writers Retreat: Mary Frances Berry, Gary Peller, Duncan Kennedy,
Devon Carbado, Luke Harris, and Chris Lehmann. Research assistance was provided by Cynthia
Luo, Elena Rodriguez, Marcus Tippens, and Teddy Fenster. Special thanks goes to Michael Kramer
who went far beyond the call of duty.
1 When referring to the CRE, I mean to include organizations and civil rights leaders who
embraced an integrationist ideal, that is, a commitment to staying the course of civil rights reform
by bringing social practices throughout American society into alignment with the nation’s ideals.
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included not only the network of faculty, administrators, judges, and
graduates who moved in concert with this commitment, but also the
lingua franca of liberal institutions.
Harvard was also a central location in the map of radical thinking
about law. Key figures in the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement
were prominent members of the law school’s faculty.2 During its heyday
at Harvard, CLS’s critiques of law and its relation to social hierarchy
coincided with a period of heightened student activism related to faculty
hiring, curricular development, and the interface between legal liberalism and Critical Race Theory. The influence of these communities of
thought in shaping an alternative view of racial power was not a simple
matter of students’ selective incorporation of legal liberalism and CLS.
Instead, the unfolding conflict became an interpretive template from
which to map the ideological investments of a race project that wasn’t
critical, utilizing the critical tools of a radical project that was only beginning to interrogate race. The battle over affirmative action at
Harvard became a social text that galvanized student critics into articulating an alternative view of racial power, one in which notions of merit
and institutional settlement were seen as mere rationalizations for the
refusal to interrogate or interrupt the core commitments of elite legal
education.3
These dynamics unfolded into projects that integrated insights about
the relationship between knowledge and racial power that had surfaced
in other sites across the university into critical discourses about law.
Critical Race Theory and intersectional feminism/antiracism emerged
from this interface as a product of ideological tension between race liberals and their left-leaning critics.4 It took shape within the simultaneous encounters between faculty and students who were struggling to
articulate how radical thinking about law and about race could crosspollinate and find expression as an intellectual and political project.
Part I of this Essay explores liberal responses to the social disruptions
that shook the country in the 1960s and 1970s, which reflected a belief
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
The legal arm of the CRE included organizations, judges, and other notables whose prestige was
built on their ability to wrest important victories from the courts, wielding the law as both sword
and shield in the fight against racial injustice.
2 Some of the Harvard faculty who were among the key figures in the CLS movement at the
time were Duncan Kennedy, Roberto Unger, Morton Horwitz, Clare Dalton, David Trubek, and
Daniel Tarullo. See Jennifer A. Kingston, Harvard Tenure Battle Puts “Critical Legal Studies” on
Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/08/30/weekinreview/harvardtenure-battle-puts-critical-legal-studies-on-trial.html [https://perma.cc/6H6P-7ZRU]; Calvin Trillin,
Harvard Law, NEW YORKER, Mar. 26, 1984, at 56.
3 See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back to
Move Forward, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1253, 1275 (2011); Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 758, 764–65, 772–73, 777.
4 See generally Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991).
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that law could facilitate orderly and meaningful reform. For race liberals in particular, the integration of bodies that had been historically
underrepresented throughout the nation’s elite institutions was a central
pillar of post-segregation society. As discussed in Part II, while this response translated into the integration of nonwhite faculty into the elite
ranks of legal education, the most committed race liberals maintained
their faith in the ideals of a colorblind meritocracy. Although race liberals would occasionally support race-conscious departures from the
colorblind norm for select integrative purposes, their idealization of
merit as colorblind and “race neutral” set the stage for a nationally publicized eruption over faculty hiring and curricular development. One
site of this conflict was the controversy over the Alternative Course at
Harvard Law School.5
I. TENSIONS OF THE 1960s AND 1970s
Although integration and its counterpoints — discrimination and
bias — are now ubiquitous as the dominant ways of thinking about
racial power, they were not always the undisputed center of gravity.
Knowledge production about race and social power has always been a
contested enterprise in which the very same dynamics that were under
study were playing out among those involved in the field. Racialized
dynamics of power and prestige contribute to how the center and margins of racial thinking are constructed. In fact, scholars of the early
twentieth century such as Oliver Cox and W.E.B. Du Bois theorized
racial power differently than those whose frameworks are now imprinted in the public consciousness.6 Along with other Black scholars,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
5 See Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1806–
07 (1989) (characterizing race consciousness as a “deviant mode” of academic evaluation that should
not be naturalized into “our conception of meritocracy,” id. at 1807). But see generally Duncan
Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705
(labeling Randall Kennedy’s position “colorblind meritocratic fundamentalism,” id. at 707, and proposing an argument against “a sharp boundary between meritocratic decision and race-based decision,” id. at 711).
6 Cox, for instance, “exposed the whiteness of sociology” with classic critiques of sociologists
Robert Park and Gunnar Myrdal. See Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1257 & n.9 (citing OLIVER
CROMWELL COX, CASTE, CLASS & RACE: A STUDY IN SOCIAL DYNAMICS 462–77 (1948)); see
also W.E. Burghardt Du Bois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 328,
328 (1935) (arguing that the quality of education matters more than whether schools are separate
or integrated). See generally W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA (1935);
ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION (1988). For accounts of the paradigm-shifting work done by
scholars in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1301 n.157 (citing
James Turner & C. Steven McGann, Black Studies as an Integral Tradition in African-American
Intellectual History, 49 J. NEGRO EDUC. 52 (1980)); and James E. Turner, Foreword: Africana
Studies and Epistemology: A Discourse in the Sociology of Knowledge, in THE NEXT DECADE:
THEORETICAL AND RESEARCH ISSUES IN AFRICANA STUDIES, at v, vii–viii (James E. Turner
ed., 1984)).
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they foregrounded a conception of racism in terms of socioeconomic
power between Black and white communities rather than as interpersonal interactions distorted by prejudice.
Although Du Bois, Cox, and others presented compelling research
conceptualizing racial power beyond the “race relations” models that informed mid-twentieth century conceptions of race liberalism, their projects were subject to disciplinary and institutional containment by powerful white scholars. Melville Herskovits and Robert E. Parks, each of
whom sat atop academic fields pertaining to African Americans,
guarded their projects against thinkers that they considered to be politically self-interested rather than academically neutral. For example, Du
Bois, regarded now as an influential pioneer of multiple disciplines including sociology, Black studies, and international relations — was labeled by Herskovits as an advocate who eschewed “objectivity” in matters pertaining to the inferiority of Black people.7
Foundations also played a significant role in shrinking the real estate
that might have otherwise grounded a research and advocacy agenda
beyond the “race relations” frame.8 Du Bois, despite his unparalleled
expertise, was never entrusted to produce a project on the scale of
Gunnar Myrdal’s An American Dilemma.9 The framing of American
racial hierarchy by Myrdal as a “dilemma” has shaped thinking about
race and reform for over half a century. In this context, the power to
punish and reward scholars based on their ideological convergence with
white power brokers is one of the many ways that contemporary thinking about racial power has been shaped by prominent whites within the
academy and civil society.10
White power brokers, however, were not the only forces that sought
to corral antiracist thinking into narrow parameters. Like academia,
the Civil Rights Establishment also observed performative norms that
reflected shared beliefs in the functional legitimacy of mainstream institutions, particularly legal ones. Key among these was the Supreme
Court, a respected institution duly regarded by many civil rights advocates as a friend to African Americans. Yet a particularly consequential
conflict implicating the tensions between centrist integrationism and a
more power-based antiracism was the 1969 publication of an article in
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
7 JERRY GERSHENHORN, MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS AND THE RACIAL POLITICS OF
KNOWLEDGE 9–10 (2004) (describing the manner in which Herskovits dismissed Black scholars
as “propagandists rather than scientists,” thus failing to acknowledge that scholarship is inherently
political and limiting the impact of his own legacy); Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1302 n.158.
8 LEAH A. GORDON, FROM POWER TO PREJUDICE 72–77 (2015).
9 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
DEMOCRACY (1944).
10 See STEPHEN STEINBERG, RACE RELATIONS: A CRITIQUE 75–76 (2007) (describing
Marxism as a “convenient scapegoat for . . . racial violence,” id. at 75, and noting that Marxist
Black scholars had to be careful to avoid backlash from white philanthropists or anti-Marxists).
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the New York Times Magazine by civil rights lawyer Lewis Steel. The
article led to Steel’s termination and the resignation of much of the legal
staff of the NAACP.
Entitled “A Critic’s View of the Warren Court — Nine Men in Black
Who Think White,” Steel’s essay challenged the celebratory view of the
Court as a liberationist institution, criticizing the Court’s limited remedial remedies for the injuries of segregation.11 Steel wrote:
[T]he Court chose to act in the manner of the practical political reformer.
Rather than ordering sweeping desegregation, it ordered another hearing.
A year later, the Court ruled that the South did not have to desegregate its
schools immediately, it merely had to do so ‘with all deliberate speed.’ . . .
The Court thereby made clear that it was a white court which would protect
the interests of white America in the maintenance of stable institutions. In
essence, the Court considered the potential damage to white Americans resulting from the diminution of privilege as more critical than continued
damage to the underprivileged.12

With neither notice nor an investigation, the NAACP Board fired
Steel for writing the article.13 The decision was subsequently ratified
by the NAACP’s Executive Director Roy Wilkins as a legitimate response to the article’s implicit denigration of the organization and the
Supreme Court.14 Yet Robert Carter, the general counsel of the
NAACP — and widely regarded as Thurgood Marshall’s Lieutenant
General in the battle over American Apartheid — found nothing disqualifying in the article and intimated that Steel’s arguments comported
with his own views. Carter denounced the Board’s actions as antithetical to the purpose of the NAACP’s legal advocacy agenda,15 contending
that the goal of civil rights attorneys “was to break new ground and to
develop new concepts of law that could be used in the struggle for freedom.”16 Pointedly, Carter stated: “Our aim had always been to fight the
status quo, not to join it . . . .”17 Yet in the eyes of the NAACP Board,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
11 See Lewis Steel, A Critic’s View of the Warren Court — Nine Men in Black Who Think White,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 13, 1968, at 56 [hereinafter Steel, A Critic’s View]. Steel wrote the article
after continually seeing what he called “classic white man’s justice” and being tormented by the
indifference of judges and overwhelmed by feelings stemming from the ineffectiveness of the courts
to make meaningful reform in a short time. See LEWIS M. STEEL WITH BEAU FRIEDLANDER,
THE BUTLER’S CHILD: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 151–53 (2016).
12 Steel, A Critic’s View, supra note 11, at 112.
13 See STEEL, supra note 11, at 155–57.
14 Letter from Roy Wilkins, NAACP Exec. Dir., to Members of the NAACP Board of Directors
(Nov. 12, 1968).
15 See ROBERT L. CARTER, A MATTER OF LAW: A MEMOIR OF STRUGGLE IN THE CAUSE
OF EQUAL RIGHTS 201–02 (2005) (describing Steel’s argument to be that “the Court had struck
down the symbols of racism while condoning or overlooking the ingrained practices that had meant
the survival of white supremacy”). Yet this argument is neither radical nor unique. Speculation in
this regard has been a consistent theme in legal and historical literature about Brown and its legacy.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 202.
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Steel had crossed the line of respectability — his analysis expressed contempt both toward institutions like the NAACP, which had marshaled
the reform project, and toward the Supreme Court, which had become
a trusted ally in the struggle against racial oppression.18 Carter stood
by Steel and demanded his reinstatement.19 The Board’s refusal
prompted Carter and “the entire general counsel’s office” of the NAACP
to
resign.20
This matter became a red-hot controversy within the wider civil
rights community as lawyers and NAACP members from across the
country weighed in.21 Many were appalled that the NAACP would take
such summary action against a respected and highly valued lawyer
simply because he publicly chastised the high court on points with which
many within the CRE agreed.22 Wilkins and others, however, argued
to the contrary.23 Jack Greenberg,24 in a letter written to the New York
Times, penned an institutional defense of the Supreme Court, pointing
out that “[t]he judiciary simply does not have the power to right all the
wrongs which need correction.”25
While Greenberg’s point did not quite meet Steel’s argument that
the Court had not fully exercised the power it did have, his letter at least
implicitly acknowledged that there was a “tolerated residuum” of white
supremacy.26 The Steel case displayed the deep conflict within the CRE
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
18
19
20
21
22

See Steel, A Critic’s View, supra note 11, at 112.
See CARTER, supra note 15, at 200–02.
Id. at 202.
See id. at 200–02.
See id. Among the civil rights advocates who expressed their dismay at the firing of Steel
were a leading group of legal scholars at Howard University who said they “believe[d] that the
N.A.A.C.P. ha[d] acted in a manner inconsistent with fundamental fairness” and “that [its] action
[was] at war with the legal positions which the Association ha[d] taken in various cases before the
United States Supreme Court.” Letter from Herbert O. Reid et al., Howard Univ. Professors, to
NAACP Board of Directors (Oct. 15, 1968), microformed on Papers of the NAACP, Pt. 16, Reel 2
(Univ. Pub’ns of Am.).
23 See Letter from Roy Wilkins to NAACP National Board Members (Oct. 24, 1968) microformed on Papers of the NAACP, Pt. 16, Reel 1 (Univ. Pub’ns of Am.) (restating the board’s concern
that the “average reader” would conclude, from the identification of Steel “as associate general
counsel of the NAACP,” “that the NAACP joined officially in his criticism”). Wilkins wrote that
Steel’s article “in effect, declared that the entire NAACP and the Negro general public had been
deluded these many decades if it regarded previous successes as being anything more solid than
vapor.” Id.
24 Jack Greenberg was the second director-counsel of the LDF and tried forty cases before the
Supreme Court during his legal career, including Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
and Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Jack Greenberg, NAACP LDF, http://www.
naacpldf.org/jack-greenberg-biography [https://perma.cc/J3CP-N6TC].
25 Letter from Jack Greenberg, NAACP Dir.-Counsel, to the Editor of the New York Times
(Oct. 17, 1968), microformed on Papers of the NAACP, Pt. 16, Reel 2 (Univ. Pub’ns of Am.).
26 Cf. Duncan Kennedy, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing and the Eroticization of Domination,
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1309, 1320 (1992) (arguing that “some abuse, what I will call the ‘tolerated
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about how to think about and engage racial power outside the authorized parameters set by Supreme Court discourse. It also reveals that
one of the ways the Harvard boycott would be framed — as mortal
combat between respectable integrationist lawyers on one hand and hotheaded activists on the other — actually reflected tensions that were
entrenched within the CRE itself.27
II. THE IDEOLOGICAL SPLIT WITHIN THE RADICAL WING
A. Historicizing Conflict Between Race Liberals and Race Crits
In the wider culture beyond the CRE, critiques of the terms of integration — particularly critiques that challenged the status quo by foregrounding questions of power — raised the specter of Black Power. Although the call for Black Power was voiced by activists who were
diverse in their demands and tactics, legal liberals and the wider CRE
often received it as a call for violence and separatism. Promoted by a
younger generation of fiery orators like Stokely Carmichael,28 and later
by Black Panthers such as Huey Newton29 and Black Muslims such as
Malcolm X, Black Power was denounced by some of the conventional
civil rights leaders as a dangerous and racist infatuation of reckless
youth. But this was both more than a generational split and less than
the separatist split that it was often portrayed to be. Within the narrower confines of the civil rights community and the university, the discourse around power illuminated ways of thinking about racial problems that transcended the contemporary emphasis on eliminating
prejudice. The effort to think about racial power beyond prejudice was
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
residuum,’ is plausibly attributed to contestable social decisions about what abuse is and how important it is to prevent it”).
27 Another conflict that caused a major split involved Angela Davis, a Black activist whose
highly publicized trial for kidnapping and murder was widely regarded by young Black activists as
an effort to dismantle the Black liberation struggle. See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE
COURTS 405 (1994). Although the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) staff voted almost unanimously to represent Davis, Greenberg overruled the vote. See id. at 404–05. He later argued that
while the staff “wanted to be seen as allies of the Black Panthers, students who tore campuses apart
and paraded with rifles, draft resisters, and prisoners who fought jailers,” these activities would
lead to self-destruction. Id. at 405. The LDF Board agreed. Id.
28 Stokely Carmichael, later known as Kwame Ture, took over the leadership of the Student
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee after ousting John Lewis in what has been framed as a shift
from nonviolence and intergrationism to self-defense and separatism. See generally Michael T.
Kaufman, Stokely Carmichael, Rights Leader Who Coined “Black Power,” Dies at 57, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 16, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/16/us/stokely-carmichael-rights-leaderwho-coined-black-power-dies-at-57.html [https://perma.cc/93GG-J3TY].
29 Huey P. Newton attended Merritt College where he organized the Black Panther Party for
Self Defense with Bobby Seale to protect their community members while taking a more militant
stance toward the plight of Black communities. Mark A. Stein, Even in Death, Newton Stirs
Sparks: Family, Friends Bitter at Those Who Label Him a Criminal, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 24, 1989),
http://articles.latimes.com/1989-08-24/news/mn-1357_1_huey-newton [https://perma.cc/7P8V-YRR7].
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not new. The deeper ideological differences between, on one hand, those
who ascribed to the centrist integrationist project, and, on the other,
those like Derrick Bell, who were sympathetic to Black Power, echoed
tensions that surfaced between scholars, lawyers, and activists throughout the twentieth century.
While the goals of the traditionalist wing of the CRE were expressed
as integration through the removal of bias, the demand of the radical
wing was for power, variously described as power to participate as a
people in American society on equal terms, power to determine destinies,
power to remake institutions that had been structured on the basis of
racial exclusion, and power to choose whether to participate in reformed
institutions or to build new ones.30 There were numerous perspectives
and conflicts even among those who identified with the power agenda.
But, in its emphasis on deepening reformist sensibilities to interrogate
“neutral” or so-called “objective” practices in the production of
knowledge and legal rules, it set terms that would eventually shape the
course of Critical Race Theory.31
The site of the university — and later, the law school — as a field of
racial struggle has often been overlooked in favor of more direct symbols
of racial power, such as polling places or lunch counters in the South.
But, for both traditionalists and more radical advocates, perspectives on
the events leading up to the Alternative Course would foreshadow differing views about how access to higher education figured into the
broader project of dismantling white supremacy. For the traditionalists,
access to higher education was crucial to developing a stable Black middle class.32 While the educational roadways to middle-class status for
white Americans had been paved by the GI Bill and access to other

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
30 See Gary Peller, History, Identity, and Alienation, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1479, 1484–85 (2011)
(comparing integrationism, which for “many African Americans . . . signified cultural assimilation
rather than liberal neutrality,” id. at 1484, with Black nationalism, which “involves the centering
of race consciousness to identify a Black community, based on the idea that race constitutes African
Americans as a distinct social group,” id. at 1485); see also Ibram Rogers, Celebrating 40 Years of
Activism, DIVERSE EDUC. (June 28, 2006), h t t p : / / d i v e r s e e d u c a t i o n . c o m / a r t i c l e / 6 0 5 3 / [h t t p s : / /
perma.cc/E3C5-ZHH3].
31 Cf. Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1309–10.
32 See Donald K. Hill, Law School, Legal Education, and the Black Law Student, 12 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 457, 489–93 (1987) (discussing the need for Black students to move from an oral
tradition to a reading tradition to help them advance and succeed in different levels of higher education); see also Kenneth L. Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1, 8–9 (1988) (explaining how “considerable increases in the numbers of black officeholders, black
professionals, and black students,” id. at 8, during the 1980s led to flourishing of the Black middle
class).
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governmental supports, Black access to higher education and professionalism had been undermined by rules that facilitated segregation in
institutions of higher education and other training programs.33
Access was also among the core concerns for the newer activists who
protested at San Francisco State and elsewhere to demand universal
access to higher education.34 But activists who foregrounded the lack
of power rather than the presence of bias as the touchstone of racial
injustice marched under a wider indictment of universities as sites of
knowledge production that legitimated white supremacy and colonized
subordinated people.35
For these critics, substantive integration involved a broadening of
the curriculum and the creation of programs and departments that set
as their objectives the development of expertise in relationship to the
needs of colonized communities.36 They too sought to eliminate a certain sense of “bias” in the educational arena. But in their thinking this
project involved interrogating how knowledge-producing industries justify and rationalize widespread inequality.37 In this frame universities
were arenas of struggle in the same way that voting booths were. They
were sites where racial power was created, aggregated, and mobilized
in ways that legitimized racially inequitable ends. And like polling
booths and lunch counters, universities were the sites of widespread organizing by Black students during this era. Indeed, during the upswing
of student activism in the 1960s, Black Student Unions were established
in every state in the union, and conflicts between students and administrators were fierce and sometimes bloody.38
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
33

See Anthony M. Platt, The Rise and Fall of Affirmative Action, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETH& PUB. POL’Y 67, 69 (1997) (“A . . . double-standard of racist and sexist practices for veterans
was imposed after World War II when the 1944 GI Bill enabled some 7.8 million, mostly white,
male veterans to afford higher education with the help of free tuition and supplies, a living subsidy
(including additional payments for children), and low-interest loans for housing. . . . The few thousand African Americans who used the GI Bill to go to college were mostly tracked into segregated,
inferior colleges.”).
34 See generally AGENTS OF CHANGE (Frank Dawson & Abby Ginzberg 2016) (documentary
examining college campus protests of the late 1960s).
35 See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1755; cf. STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES
V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER 30–32 (1967) (describing the detrimental effect of “adaptation,” id.
at 30, on the Black community).
36 See Randall Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1755 (“In the 1970’s, activists associated with the Black
Power Movement expressed . . . demands concerning academia . . . . Among the demands were
that evaluative criteria designed by and for blacks supplement or replace ‘white standards,’ that
‘black studies’ be accorded recognition as a distinct area of scholarly endeavor, and that black
studies be taught and governed exclusively or predominantly by black professors and students.”).
37 Id. at 1754–60 (discussing the cultural context of racial critiques and the need to examine the
relationship between knowledge and power).
38 See, e.g., George Lowery, A Campus Takeover That Symbolized an Era of Change, CORNELL
CHRON. (Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/2009/04/campus-takeover-symbolizedera-change [https://perma.cc/BX5M-RQY5].
ICS
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B. Student Activism and Derrick Bell
These divisions were, by the 1980s, well rehearsed both within the
CRE and between the CRE and student movements. Protests and agitation for greater university access and curricular reform had spread
across the country in the late 1960s, and the reverberations were still felt
in universities and colleges long after the sharpest conflicts had receded
into history.39 These issues, however, were fairly distant from the immediate concerns of law school administrators in the 1980s. Efforts to
bring greater diversity into law schools were mainly achieved through
student recruitment.40 Harvard was one of the most aggressively committed law schools when it came to matriculating nontraditional students from both the United States and the wider international community.41 With a “diversity” agenda managed largely by opening a pipeline
of students to pass through the institution, the specter of open racial
conflict at Harvard Law School was perhaps far from the center of the
school’s concerns as the post–civil rights generation made their way to
Cambridge. Antiwar politics that had disrupted the law school were
distant memories by the 1980s, and the most significant political tensions
were associated with young white male leftists, who by 1983 were asserting an intellectual and political agenda that challenged some of the
basic premises of mainstream legal education.
As Professor Christopher Edley Jr. noted in a contemporaneous account of the events that erupted over race at Harvard, the seeds of the
controversy were planted when Derrick Bell left the school after teaching there for eleven years.42 A former civil rights lawyer who had
worked with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) and for the Department of Justice, Bell was recruited and hired by Harvard, becoming
its first Black law professor in 1969.43 As Bell would later say of his
hiring, his were not the formal credentials of a typical professor at
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
39

See Ronald Walters & Robert Smith, The Black Education Strategy in the 1970s, 48 J. NEEDUC. 156, 157 (1979) (noting that “[t]he protest demands of black students [in 1969] were
generally reformist, specific and programmatic in character,” and describing “more black courses,”
an “increase [in] black student enrollment,” and “more black faculty” as among the most frequently
demanded changes).
40 See, e.g., Luz E. Herrera, Challenging a Tradition of Exclusion: The History of an Unheard
Story at Harvard Law School, 5 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 51, 53 n.10 (2002) (describing recruiting
efforts directed at minority students by Harvard Law School).
41 See id. at 53 & n.9.
42 See Christopher Edley, Jr., The Boycott at Harvard: Should Teaching Be Colorblind?, WASH.
POST, Aug. 18, 1982, at A23.
43 See Derrick Bell, Jr., A Question of Credentials [hereinafter Bell, Credentials], in BLACKS AT
HARVARD: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE AT
HARVARD AND RADCLIFFE 467, 471 (Werner Sollors et al. eds., 1993); Fred A. Bernstein, Derrick
Bell, Pioneering Law Professor and Civil Rights Advocate, Dies at 80, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2011),
http :// w w w.n y ti mes.c om/2011/10/06/us/derrick -be ll-pi one erin g- har vard -l aw -pr of ess or-d ies- a t 80.html [https://perma.cc/JVW3-LDGM].
GRO

2308

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 130:2298

Harvard, where a degree from a fancy law school, membership on the
law review, and a prestigious clerkship were de rigueur.44 Bell’s credentials were developed in another universe populated by a community of
civil rights lawyers who strategized and fought for what has since been
called a legal revolution. Most of the legal eagles of the civil rights
generation were developed in laboratories far removed from elite white
schools in the nation. Legal stars like Thurgood Marshall45 and Robert
Carter46 had executed Charles Hamilton Houston’s47 long-term campaign to upend segregation from headquarters at Howard Law School
and the legal offices of the NAACP. It was an unlikely campaign that
drew upon technical mastery, creativity, political and social theory, multistate mobilizing, and movement financing to entangle multiple legal
actors in a drama that reached its zenith in Brown v. Board of Education.48 It produced scores of lawyers across the country who had handson experience with using the same legal system that had facilitated
American Apartheid to dismantle it. It touched the lives of millions of
Americans. It engaged thousands of judges, administrators, and policymakers. It reformed hundreds of institutions. And in the end, the campaign produced one law professor that Harvard Law School was willing
to hire: Derrick Bell. By 1980 when that professor left, the deep pool of
Black talent that produced the civil rights revolution had apparently
run dry.49
While Harvard’s administrators likely anticipated that Bell’s departure would present institutional challenges given their assessment of the
talent pool, there was little to suggest that a crisis was brewing about
the curricular gap that opened in the wake of his departure. As administrators admitted to a student delegation that first inquired about Bell’s
missing course, the school had simply overlooked it. This oversight signaled at least in part the sense that Bell’s course was valued mainly as
an exercise of academic freedom rather than as a central undertaking of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
44 Derrick Bell, A Pre-Memorial Message on Law School Teaching, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 205, 208 (1997).
45 See William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARV. L. REV. 23,
36–37 (1991); THURGOOD MARSHALL: SUP. CT. JUST. & C.R. ADVOC., http://thurgoodmarshall.
com [https://perma.cc/Z2SB-YHPP].
46 See CARTER, supra note 15, at 31–33, 95–96, 146–47, 214–20.
47 See A Symposium on Charles Hamilton Houston, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 589, 596–98, 600
(1993).
48 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For further background, see generally MARK V. TUSHNET, THE
NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925–1950 (2004 ed.).
49 See Abby D. Phillip, Race Sparked HLS Tension: Lack of Faculty Diversity Sparked Boycotts
at HLS, HARVARD CRIMSON (June 1, 2008), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2008/6/1/racesparked-hls-tension-a-battle/ [https://perma.cc/3KXX-5HCL] (“[Dean James] Vorenberg held fast
to Harvard’s longstanding position that it could not find qualified tenure-track faculty members
because the pool of such scholars was limited.”).
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a modern law school.50 That the course may have been regarded as a
boutique offering was bolstered by the content of the course itself.51
“Constitutional Law and Minority Issues” diverged from some of the
standard treatments of law in relation to the race problem. It was neither a civil rights “how to” course, nor was it an effort to shoehorn a
vision of civil rights into the constitutional ecosystem that protected existing entitlements and values.52
A symbolic representation of Bell’s theoretical orientation was embodied in the lithograph of Tommie Smith and John Carlos that was
prominently located in the opening pages of his textbook, Race, Racism,
and American Law.53 At the 1968 Olympics, Smith and Carlos had
raised their fists in a Black Power salute during the ceremonial awarding of their gold and bronze medals for the 200-meter event. Their actions were widely criticized within the mainstream press as an embarrassment to the nation.54 Many civil rights leaders distanced themselves
from the protest actions of these and other athletes of the era. Whether
pressed or not, mainstream leaders of the Civil Rights Establishment
clung to a vision of racial equality that eschewed most symbols or rhetorical gestures that drew any link between race and power.55 For Bell,
however, the image symbolized the analogous point of departure of the
book. Bell would run the race by rendering a thorough engagement
with the relevant law. But, like Carlos and Smith, he would not subordinate Black interests to the rituals of the national ego. Thus, throughout Bell’s treatment of civil rights in his text, the principle issues he
explored were the doctrinal rules and policy choices that rationalized
and constituted the racial disempowerment of Black people.56 In this
sense, Bell’s text diverged significantly from conventional approaches to
such topics. Traditional theorizing seemed to require theorists to color
inside the lines of federalism and existing rights. But Bell’s view was
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
50
51

See Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1266 & n.35.
See id. at 1267 (noting that Dean Vorenberg questioned “what was ‘so special’ about [the]
course”).
52 See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, The First Decade: Critical Reflections, or “A Foot in the
Closing Door,” 49 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1349 (2002).
53 DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW, at vii–viii (6th ed. 2008) (“This
book is dedicated to all those who throughout America’s history have risked its wrath to protest its
faults. Courageous black athletes mounted a famous protest against racism at the 1968 Olympic
Games. That protest, like so many that preceded it, constituted a prophecy . . . .” Id. at vii).
54 See, e.g., Muriel Nitzkin, Letter to the Editor, ‘Silent Protest’ at Olympics, CHI. TRIB., Oct.
23, 1968, at 20 (“[They] show[ed] flagrant disrespect for their country and the competition, . . . [and]
they have dishonored all Americans — black and white.”).
55 See Roy Wilkins, Opinion, The Big Olympic Mistake, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1968, at B7 (dismissing the protest as “comparatively mild” and myopic).
56 See BELL, supra note 53, at 683 (“This book is concerned primarily with American racism
initiated by whites against blacks, and it reviews the extent to which racial discrimination is legitimated by the law, as well as many of the efforts to utilize the law to remedy racial bias.”).
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that these lines themselves constituted the constitutional and legal structure within which white supremacy was maintained. Unlike Professor
Herbert Wechsler and other constitutional giants whose holy grail was
the elusive neutral principle that could ground racial reform,57 Bell engaged the law in pursuit of the full liberation of African Americans, a
principle that from his point of view was just as political or neutral as
any investment in the status quo.58 Bell’s sympathy for the Black Power
agenda placed his course and his textbook in an ideological camp decidedly apart from the civil rights leadership, many of whom were embarrassed and repulsed by a new racial justice discourse centered on
power.59
By the time the students who would eventually lead the Alternative
Course arrived at Harvard Law School, Derrick Bell had given notice
that he would be leaving to take up the Deanship at the University of
Oregon Law School, citing frustration at the slow pace of change.60 His
departure left only one other professor of color on the staff,61 and as
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
57 See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 34 (1959) (questioning the legitimacy of the Brown decision because he could not identify any
neutral principle that would distinguish between the rights of black school children to associate and
the rights of white school children not to). For a compelling critique of the conservative underpinnings of Neutral Principles, see Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950’s, 21 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 561 (1988).
58 See Derrick Bell, The Law Student as Slave, in THE DERRICK BELL READER 278, 283
(Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2005) (“It is time to free yourselves, move your law schools
toward liberation, and thereby increase the chances that you and the lawyers who follow you will
have the courage as well as the skill to provide this country the leaders we so desperately need —
leaders for whom the bottom line is not dollars earned but personal integrity and public service.”).
59 See YVONNE RYAN, ROY WILKINS: THE QUIET REVOLUTIONARY AND THE NAACP
168–69 (2014) (“[NAACP Executive Director Roy Wilkins] went on to define in the harshest, most
uncompromising way his views on Black Power. ‘No matter how endlessly they try to explain it,
the term “Black Power” means anti-white power. In a racially pluralistic society, the concept, the
formation and the exercise of an ethnically-tagged power means opposition to other ethnic powers,
just as the term “white supremacy” means subjection of all non-white people. In the black-white
relationship, it has to mean that every other ethnic power is the rival and the antagonist of “Black
Power.” It has to mean “going-it-alone.” It has to mean separatism[,]’ . . . [which] offer[s] little to
the disadvantaged but the chance to ‘shrivel and die. . . . It is a reverse Mississippi, a reverse Hitler,
a reverse Ku Klux Klan. Black Power . . . can mean in the end only black death.’” (second and
third omissions in original)); STEPHEN L. WASBY, RACE RELATIONS LITIGATION IN AN AGE
OF COMPLEXITY 64 (1995) (“[Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund Jack]
Greenberg is said to have shown dislike for staff lawyers who advocated providing legal support to
‘radicals’ or who themselves seemed to be radical . . . .”); “Black Power” Slogan of Negroes Lambasted and Defended, CHI. TRIB., July 27, 1966, at 9 (“The Negroes’ new slogan ‘black power,’
was criticized and defended by Negro leaders yesterday . . . . [Dr.] King . . . said the term ‘black
power’ was unfortunate . . . [and that] a struggle for black supremacy is as evil as white
supremacy.”).
60 See DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY 43 (1994).
61 At the time of Bell’s departure from Harvard Law School, the only other Black faculty member was Clarence Clyde Ferguson, a 1951 Harvard graduate who had previously served on the
faculty of Rutgers Law School, as dean of the Howard Law School, and as ambassador to Uganda.
Id. at 43–44; see also Bell, Credentials, supra note 43, at 472 (“My efforts at Harvard to recruit more

2017]

RACE LIBERALISM AND RACIAL REFORM

2311

previously noted, Bell’s tenured course was simply removed from the
curriculum. For students, Bell’s departure left significant gaps to be
filled in terms of both personnel and curriculum. The need for more
professors of color was obvious and urgent, as was the need for Bell’s
fourteen-week course “Constitutional Law and Minority Issues” on
treatment of the law and its relationship to racial hierarchy.
That the Administration did not share the same sense of urgency was
apparent in the reactions of Dean James Vorenberg to a delegation of
students who were sent by a consortium of student groups to press for
the course and for a Black professor to teach it.62 The students made
the case that the search for someone to teach Bell’s course should more
broadly identify and recruit scholars of color.63 As they saw it, the insights that would be derived from someone whose experience included
practicing law as a racialized subject were an important perspective that
they wanted to engage.64
Dean Vorenberg framed his response to the students by proffering
two distinct queries. The first was to challenge the students to articulate
what they hoped to learn in the now defunct course, “Constitutional
Law and Minority Issues.”65 The second was to challenge the students’
preference for a Black professor, countering with a hypothetical question
about whether an excellent white professor wouldn’t be preferable to a
mediocre Black one.66 The first question was especially challenging because students would have had to have taken the course to be able to
fully answer it. The second was useful as a pithy but deeply revealing
statement about how the Administration and potentially the wider faculty that couldn’t be found in the standard constitutional law offering
and a stint at legal services saw things.
After Dean Vorenberg set the terms of the contestation about the
course and demands to hire more minority law professors, the conflict’s
unfolding uncovered sharply divergent beliefs about what liberal institutions should be doing to meet the expectations of integration. Matters
only escalated when the faculty voted to hire ten white male professors
that spring.67 The Dean continued to point to the pool problem when
pressed about the dearth of minority law professors in the class of new
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
blacks with backgrounds similar to mine were stymied by faculty who preferred to wait for applicants with academic credentials like their own, but who just happened to be black. Blacks with
high-level academic credentials do exist.”).
62 See Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1267.
63 Id. at 1266.
64 Letter from Irma Tyler Wood to James Vorenberg, Dean, Harvard Law Sch. (Mar. 9, 1982)
(on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
65 Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1267.
66 Dave Horn, Third World Coalition Renews Support for Course Boycott, HARV. L. REC., Sept.
17, 1982, at 1.
67 See id.
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hires. For students, the all-white hiring episode reinforced their sense
that the faculty imagined the pool of possible colleagues of color to be
extremely shallow. The faculty’s tolerance for a continuing state of gross
underrepresentation seemed especially formalistic in light of their past
ability to see and value the qualifications of Derrick Bell. As for the
Administration, the evolutionary approach that seemed to students to
project any significant integration far into the future wasn’t quite the
distant possibility that the students feared. Although the Dean had not
shared this information with them, he had reason to believe that one
Black candidate would join the faculty within the coming months, and
others were mulling over their offers.68 Faculty operating with this
knowledge may well have seen the students’ frustrations as likely to
settle once the Administration’s efforts to recruit select candidates were
made public. In the meantime, however, the Dean announced that a
new course would be offered in the three-week intersession.69 The
course would feature two civil rights lawyers, Julius Chambers70 and
Jack Greenberg, and would cover civil rights litigation. It was widely
agreed upon that this offering was a response to student demands for
Bell’s course to be offered. What was not widely agreed upon was
whether this course met the students’ expectations.
From the students’ perspective, it did not.71 In response, a broad
coalition of student organizations pooled their resources to launch an
alternative course that featured a dozen faculty members of color from
across the country, each of whom visited the law school to teach a unit
from Bell’s text. Several Harvard Law School professors associated
with CLS offered independent study credit for students who enrolled in
the course and produced written work.72 The Coalition’s decision to
boycott the Administration’s offering in favor of a student-initiated alternative produced two notable outcomes. First, it provided an opportunity for a critical mass of students and young professors to engage
with each other in parsing and expanding an intellectual critique of racial liberalism. The themes and ideas that emerged from this collective
engagement between students and young professors would eventually
cohere as a set of texts that would become part of the Critical Race
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
68
69
70

See Edley, supra note 42.
Horn, supra note 66, at 1.
Julius LeVonne Chambers succeeded Jack Greenberg as the director-counsel of the LDF and
tried several cases before the Supreme Court, including Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), which dealt with school desegregation, and Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30 (1986), which focused on minority voting rights, during his legal career. Julius Levonne
Chambers In Memoriam, NAACP LDF (Aug. 3, 2013), http://www.naacpldf.org/news/statementpassing-former-ldf-president-director-counsel-julius-levonne-chambers [https://perma.cc/T5KV-DRWD].
71 See Third World Coalition Letter (May 24, 1982), in BLACKS AT HARVARD, supra note 43,
at 457, 457–58 [hereinafter Third World Coalition Letter].
72 See Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1280.
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Theory canon. The Alternative Course also lit a fuse that would explode
into a national debate.73 Exposing the hidden fault lines that had long
existed within the civil rights constituency. While many in the CRE saw
the students’ protest as an embodiment of black power politics that they
sought to discredit, the students saw meritocracy as the new lunch counters in the struggle over law, knowledge, and power.
The students argued that the law school’s course offered neither an
approach to recruit more minority law professors to join Harvard’s faculty, nor a substantive treatment that engaged an array of issues beyond
the enforcement of civil rights laws.74 On the former question, neither
instructor filled the role that the students imagined — a candidate willing to join Harvard’s faculty who could teach about race and the law,
and who would model the skills and critical thinking that “Third World”
lawyers would likely need. Neither sought a full time position at
Harvard, and equally salient for many of the students was the fact that
Greenberg would not have integrated the faculty even were he to have
expressed interest in Harvard.75 On the matter of the course, while the
nuts and bolts of civil rights litigation were obviously useful, the
Administration’s offering of it as the only replacement for Bell’s class
appeared to students to substantively dismiss Bell’s broader inquiry into
the vexed relationship between law and racial power. This critical orientation toward legal institutions echoed the perspectives of Steel and
others who had been punished for venturing down this wayward path.
To students who shared the perspective of Black Law Students
Association (BLSA) President Muhammad Kenyatta,76 the Administration’s course seemed to confirm critiques raised by Bell and others about
who should control the antiracism agenda and whose interests were
served. Kenyatta stated bluntly that “[f]or many years the distinction
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
73 Fox Butterfield, Harvard Law School Torn by Race Issue, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 1990),
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/26/us/harvard-law-school-torn-by-race-issue.html [https://perma.
cc/CD25-MZ3R].
74 See Third World Coalition Letter, supra note 71; James Vorenberg Letter (July 21, 1982), in
BLACKS AT HARVARD, supra note 43, at 459, 459–60 (enclosing the letter written by Muhammad
Kenyatta — President of the Harvard Black Law Students Association — explaining the organization’s intent to boycott the course).
75 GREENBERG, supra note 27, at 502–04.
76 A critic of racial liberalism, Kenyatta was not a stranger to high-profile agitation, nor the
threat of repressive consequences. See Kenyatta v. Moore, 623 F. Supp. 224 (S.D. Miss. 1985) (addressing Kenyatta’s allegations that the FBI violated his First Amendment rights by surveilling and
threatening him under their counterintelligence program). Kenyatta strongly opposed the hiring of
Greenberg. The opposition became widely publicized, garnering critiques that Kenyatta opposed
Greenberg because of his race, an accusation which Kenyatta rejected, claiming that his letter to
the Dean focused on the lack of black faculty members. Brando Simeo Starkey, Drastic Action:
The 1983 Course Boycott at Harvard Law School, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 56, 62–69 (2008); Michel
Marriott, Muhammad Kenyatta, 47, Dies; Professor and Civil Rights Leader, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6,
1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/06/nyregion/muhammad-kenyatta-47-dies-professor-andcivil-rights-leader.html [https://perma.cc/E7ES-JCGH].
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has been blurred between the orthodox liberal agenda and the autonomous aspirations of Afro-Americans.”77
The complicated backstory and varied orientations of the students
were collapsed into a familiar narrative of Black radicals railing against
their white allies in news reports and op-eds that followed the Dean’s
framing of the issue to the student body.78 In a letter to the student
population, the Dean included a letter from Kenyatta and went on to
say that “to boycott a course on racial discrimination, because part of it
is taught by a white lawyer, is wrong in principle and works against, not
for, shared goals of racial and social justice.”79 The Dean’s letter was
picked up by the press and in short order a student-led protest over
curricular offerings and minority recruitment became another flash
point in the continuing struggles between liberals and radicals that had
undermined the civil rights movement and threatened its future. The
students’ refusal to accept the seminar, laced with a letter from the
BLSA President with criticism of Greenberg’s role at the helm of an
African American organization, prompted a swift rebuke from the
CRE.80 Stalwarts from multiple quarters of the establishment came to
Harvard’s defense, citing the distinguished careers of the two civil rights
attorneys and denouncing the students as bigots. The iconic Bayard
Rustin81 declared that the protest was “nothing more than blatant racism.”82 The more moderate Carl T. Rowan83 pronounced the students
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
77 Muhammad Kenyatta, Letter to the Editor, At Harvard the Course of Civil Rights Doesn’t
Run Smooth, WALL STREET J., Sept. 13, 1982, at 31.
78 Media coverage of the course boycott began in July after Dean Vorenberg mailed a series of
letters to all returning students. For a reprinting of his letters and some of the responses by other
key players, see The Greenberg-Chambers Incident: Harvard Law School, 1982–83, in BLACKS AT
HARVARD, supra note 43, at 457, 457–67.
79 James Vorenberg Letter, supra note 74, at 459–60.
80 Martin Kilson, a black Harvard government professor, stated that the “[b]lack students who
require ethnocentric crutches as part of their academic regime have to start growing up.” Martin
Kilson, Ethnic Arrogance at Harvard, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 1982, at A19.
81 In addition to organizing the 1963 March on Washington, Rustin worked closely with Martin
Luther King, Jr., and a number of other leaders, bringing nonviolent protest techniques to the
movement. See generally JOHN D’EMILIO, LOST PROPHET: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF BAYARD
RUSTIN (2004); Devon W. Carbado & Donald Weise, The Civil Rights Identity of Bayard Rustin,
82 TEX. L. REV. 1133 (2004).
82 Bayard Rustin, Letter to the Editor, A Misguided Protest by Blacks at Harvard, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 17, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/08/17/opinion/l-a-misguided-protest-by-blacks-atharvard-087725.html [https://perma.cc/7QPL-HK6F].
83 Carl T. Rowan was a journalist and writer who wrote extensively about race and race relations in America. He served as the U.S. Ambassador to Finland, the first Black Deputy Secretary
of State, and the first Black director of the United States Information Agency. See Elaine Scolino,
Carl Rowan, Writer and Crusader, Dies at 75, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2000), https://nyti.ms/2y5Qb93
[https://perma.cc/8W74-FQLV]; J.Y. Smith, Columnist Carl Rowan Dies at 75, WASH. POST (Sept.
24, 2000), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/09/24/columnist-carl-rowan-diesat-75/937ade80-e482–46a5-bb47–5ec416fae97f/ [https://perma.cc/4DZX-ZPLT].
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to be “racist, anti-intellectual, [and] anti-civil-rights.”84 Yet beneath the
assertion of “principle” was a disagreement about the principles that
should dictate the terms of institutional engagement. No invocation of
“shared goals” could justify for the students a state of institutional affairs
that appeared to differ little from the preceding decades.
Having been condemned by civil rights elders for essentially biting
the hands that fed them, student leaders viewed the CRE critics as compromised by their embrace of liberal institutional values — values that
blinded them to the ways in which the earlier generation’s struggles
against white supremacy on busses and at lunch counters were being
played out again in law schools and elsewhere in American society. The
student critics were dismayed that their critique of the Administration’s
actions could be written off so effortlessly, particularly in light of the use
of rationales like “qualifications” and gradualism that civil rights lawyers had found to stymie meaningful reform elsewhere.85 The fact that
Harvard Law School administrators and faculty were liberal allies in
elite spaces no doubt contributed to a willingness to assume good faith
on their part. But from the student’s perspective, the issue was never
one of bad faith. The problem for the students was the opposite: the
establishment’s unshakable belief that fidelity to what it viewed as neutral institutional practices was appropriate and fair.86 The foundational
belief that had long characterized race liberals was that racial disparities
would eventually fade as people of color were shorn of their particularities and absorbed into race-neutral spaces.
There had been reason to think that in the context of a new social
regime, institutions like Harvard might have thoroughly reevaluated the
content of their curriculum in light of the new communities and values
they might serve. After all, as noted above, Harvard was far from a
bastion of conservative resistance to integration. It had stepped up its
recruiting of minority students in the 1970s, and some of its faculty were
engaged in efforts to bring about social change elsewhere. The Dean

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
84 Carl T. Rowan, Harvard Blacks Fail Bias Test, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 15,
1982, at B-2.
85 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (holding that aptitude tests used in
hiring practices having a disparate impact on ethnic minorities must be reasonably job related). In
addition to legal challenges against tests and other measures used to exclude Black applicants from
access to employment and promotions, civil rights lawyers had reason to be suspicious of the use of
meritocratic discourse to justify the exclusion of Black teachers. As Carter explains, Black teachers
and administrators were sometimes fired en masse in the wake of integration on the grounds that
they were comparatively unqualified. CARTER, supra note 15, at 156–57. Carter notes that these
arguments were specious, and that sometimes Black educators had acquired credentialization that
outpaced their white counterparts. Id.
86 See Third World Coalition Letter, supra note 71, at 456–57.
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himself was on the Executive Committee of the premier civil rights litigation organization, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund.87 Underlying the
school’s inability to reconsider the source of the pool problem, however,
was a failure on its part to constructively critique its own everyday practices and norms. There was a gold standard that remained in place —
immune from reassessment — and it translated into an inability to
reevaluate and rethink those dimensions of law school practice that were
forged in, and consistent with, unwarranted exclusionary criteria. From
the critics’ perspective, there was nothing essential or compelling about
the “standard” criteria that justified the refusal to consider alternative
“qualifications.” This critique included the assertion that knowledge
gained from the particular experience of being a lawyer of color in postapartheid American society could indeed constitute an important consideration.88 From this point of view, race could be a meaningful consideration if solving the “race problem” had been viewed in terms of
addressing the ways that law in general and legal teaching in particular
were sites in which racial power was mediated and justified.89
But addressing underrepresentation in terms of racial power ran
against the liberal grain of framing discrimination as bias; that is to say,
a distortion of institutional procedures. Bias, once identified, could be
managed through embracing neutral practices — ideally through a
colorblind prism — rather than normalizing the practice of measuring
racial progress through substantive benchmarks.
The tensions between the students and the CRE were also shaped
by disparate conceptions of what the role of “integrating” students was
meant to be. Among the most fundamental commitments of the integrationist vision was the idea that exposing different races to one another would confirm that race was a meaningless social category, a set
of assumptions that reflected habits of the mind rather than realities
anchored in the material world.90 To civil rights elders, having fought
so hard alongside white allies to dislodge beliefs that racial outsiders
were ill-suited to compete in elite environments, the last thing they
wanted to hear were demands that those institutions accommodate racially grounded requests to abandon “neutral” criteria of inclusion.91
The sense of dismay among the senior generation was palpable. Not
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
87 Vorenberg, Ninth Dean of Law School, Dies, HARV. GAZETTE (Apr. 20, 2000), http://news.
harvard.edu/gazette/story/2000/04/vorenberg-ninth-dean-of-law-school-dies/ [https://perma.cc/9W8ZKQPB].
88 See Bell, Credentials, supra note 43, at 473 (“The correlation between good grades and academic success is not so close that the school should reject the students’ suggestion that at least one
civil rights teacher, in a school with so large a faculty, should have experienced, as well as worked
to end, racial discrimination.”).
89 See Duncan Kennedy, supra note 5, at 718.
90 An example of this rhetoric is found in the Supreme Court’s doctrine of using diversity as the
justification for the use of race-conscious measures in universities. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
91 See GREENBERG, supra note 27, at 502–04.
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only had students failed to meet the expectations of the integrationist
project, but also, in protesting the actions of liberal whites, they had
disrespected their allies and threatened the principles that were central
to the multiracial coalition of integrationism. By contrast, from the students’ perspective, if integration was to be meaningful at all, it could
not be realized by simply assimilating into institutions shaped by the
very practices that had rationalized the exclusion of people of color in
the past. Moreover, race consciousness in recruiting faculty as well as
students was not an evil that needed to be suppressed. It was instead a
basis for transforming institutions and for identifying and serving historically constituted communities.
The ideological conflict between race liberals and those who sympathized with a more radical tradition, then, revealed that the way that
race and racism were conceptualized was linked to how practices that
reproduce the status quo are perceived. To the students, Harvard’s response to the curricular and faculty deficiencies that prompted the controversy helped to clarify that what counted as qualified and what viewpoints about race and law were valued had been built on established
practices from the past. The claim that they were neutral and necessary
obscured the fact that reliance on such criteria reflected unwarranted
policy choices rather than institutional necessities. By contrast, to administrators and faculty, what the students saw as institutional deficits
were simply opportunities waiting to be filled with the right kind of
candidate.
Beyond the internal defenses of the curricular and hiring practices,
students were stunned that their CRE critics failed to see, much less
interrogate, how the same baselines that were used to frame the students
as “biased” were also operating to frame other race-conscious policies as
reverse discrimination across the societal terrain.92
III. CONCLUSION: THE RISE OF CRITICAL RACE THEORY
The generation of students and young professors who entered elite
law schools during the post–civil rights era found scant intellectual
space within these institutions to interrogate the implications of the civil
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
92 Harvard’s relatively aggressive recruitment of minority students was not matched by a similar commitment to recruit faculty, leading student protestors to note that if Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), justified using race as a factor in admissions, then surely
Harvard could consider race as a factor in employment. See, e.g., Donald Christopher Tyler &
Cynthia Muldrow, Letter to the Editor, Goal of a Boycott at Harvard Law, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20,
1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/08/20/opinion/l-goal-of-a-boycott-at-harvard-law-094699.html
[https://perma.cc/YZ3N-YN4K]; see also Donald Christopher Tyler, Letter to the Editor, The Law
School Controversy: Two Views, HARV. CRIMSON (Sept. 16, 1982), http://www.thecrimson.com/
article/1982/9/16/the-law-school-controversy-two-views/ [https://perma.cc/ZW7T-XCU5].
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rights retrenchment that was unfolding across society.93 Set in the context of the retreating project of racial reform, the pitched institutional
struggle at Harvard Law School over curricular offerings and faculty
hiring marked ideological tensions within the civil rights constituency.
The unexpected fracture within the CRE that underwrote the conflict
was matched by an equally unexpected convergence between students
and faculty of color and the largely white, newly situated left-leaning
theorists who constituted CLS.94 The CLS approach to law was irreverent, critical of both the rule of law and faith in rights-based reform.
It was committed to demystifying the ways that legal ideology worked
to generate consent to conditions of inequality.95
As the insights around institutional struggles in law schools across
the country brought out the limitations of the prevailing dialogues, critical thinkers took up a more sustained project of examining doctrinal
discourses that replicated the naturalization of racial power the controversy had revealed. Responding to rollbacks of race-conscious policies
and the narrowed scope of equal protection doctrine, critical race theorists developed an alternative line of argumentation. Influenced in
many ways by its early associations with CLS, CRT emphasized the
ways that legal rules continued to facilitate the social construction of
race, not simply as a long-term consequence of past segregation, but
through rules that helped constitute racial interests and that continued
to insulate them from both judicially and legislatively mandated
redistribution.96
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
93 The rise of neoconservativism in the 1970s and 1980s called for the end of affirmative action,
class-based remedies, and other race-specific remedial measures. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw,
Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 12
GERMAN L.J. 247, 250 (2011). Additional examples of retrenchment include “Reagan’s attempt to
fire members of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, the Administration’s opposition to
the 1982 amendment of the Voting Rights Act, and Reagan’s veto of the Civil Rights Restoration
Act.” Id.
94 I have reviewed related elements of this narrative in other works. See Crenshaw, supra note
52, at 1364; Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1277–87; see also CRITICAL RACE THEORY xxii (Kimberlé
Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (noting that the “Alternative Course exemplified [the importance of] . . .
contest[ing] the . . . dominant legal discourse”).
95 See Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 178, 199 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
96 See Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1294 n.133. For the first generation of white male crits who
focused on debunking the naturalness of market ideology, the contested baseline was the common
law distribution of rights and entitlements. For feminists, the embeddedness of male power in the
everyday assumptions of social practices was central. For Race Crits, the unspoken norm of whiteness that sat at the center of colorblind analysis was the point of departure. Intersectionality targeted conceptions of whiteness and maleness that were embedded in both legal doctrine and political discourses pertaining to sex and race discrimination. These lines of argumentation were in
some ways contestatory both in their initial articulation and response. But, this collection of moves
deepened a sense of how the more significant struggles were not simply about the permissible scope
of any potential remedy, but about the baselines from which particular social conditions would be
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Although Harvard Law School celebrates its bicentennial thirtyseven years after Professor Derrick Bell’s departure to Oregon, the need
for reform and the critical orientation in legal education that he embodied remains as salient as ever. Indeed, just in 2016, Harvard Law student activists called on the school to a create a Critical Race Theory
program to help contextualize the school’s curriculum, describing their
efforts as “intellectually descended from the numerous student movements that have arisen time and again at Harvard Law School.”97 Like
the struggles at Harvard in the 1980s, today’s student activism must be
read as a chapter in the ongoing conflict between the liberal center and
the critical left on how to conceptualize the contemporary implications
of American Apartheid. From yesterday’s contestations over the ideals
of colorblind meritocracy to today’s interment of the short and bittersweet romance with post-racialism, race liberals and their radical critics
have struggled over the terms of engagement with legal institutions and
their role in reproducing racial hierarchy. Understandably, these historical conflicts may seem to offer little analytic value in the face of the
seismic shift to the right on race matters, evidenced from Charlottesville
to the White House. The resurrection of pre–civil rights discourse in
today’s post- post-racial America may underwrite the assumption that
the historic tensions between centrist liberals and race radicals are utterly irrelevant in understanding this moment. But ideological struggles
over how social power is framed and contested in one era do not simply
fade away with the rightward shifts and ideological reboots in the next.
To the contrary, these histories track how ideological conflicts over the
scope of racial reform were resolved in ways that depoliticized the revolt
against racial power in American institutions, further entrenching defenses that naturalize the racial status quo.
The story of race, reform, and retrenchment is an endlessly renewable narrative in American history, one in which legal discourse has
played a recurring starring role.98 This enduring problem calls for a
rigorous examination of the law and its role in reproducing racial hierarchy. Not only is this critical project far from obsolete within liberal
institutions, the continuing saga of race and racism in American society
underscores the need for it.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
framed as either natural or illegitimately imposed. For Critical Race Theorists, the move to interrogate baselines opened up a wider template from which to challenge the relationship between law
and racial power. It also extended the critique of race liberalism to a set of policies that now constitute its post-racial successor.
97 Claire E. Parker, Law School Activists Occupy Student Center, HARV. CRIMSON (Feb. 17,
2016, 9:43 PM), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2016/2/17/activists-occupy-wasserstein/ [https://
perma.cc/HP6J-M4RM].
98 See id. (noting a student’s discontent that “the Law School’s current curriculum often approaches law as if it were created in a vacuum without regard to its implications for minorities”).

